Specific Defenses in law of torts India notes – CSEET

Specific Defenses in law of torts India:

ICSI CSEET: The Council of the ICSI has released a notice regarding CSEET on the day of the inauguration of ICSI Golden Jubilee Celebrations on 4th Oct 2017.

The Gazette Notification on the Company Secretaries (Amendment) Regulations, 2020 has been published on 3^rd February 2020 in the Official Gazette of India and the same shall be applicable from the said date of publication.

Now ICSI Published a notice regarding CSEET Test which going to start from 2020 May.

We are now going to discuss the details of CSEET Paper-2 Legal Aptitude and Logical Reasoning – Specific Defenses in law of torts India notes.

Specific Defenses in law of torts India

Specific Defenses in law of torts India:

General defences are a set of defences or ‘excuses’ that you can undertake to escape liability in tort only if your actions have qualified a specific set of conditions that go attached with these defences, when the plaintiff brings an action against defendant for a particular tort, providing the existence of all the essential of that tort the defendant would be liable for the same. The defendant may, however, even in such a case, avoid his liability by taking the plea of some defence. There is some specific defence which is peculiar to some defence. There are some specific defences which are peculiar to some particular wrongs, for example, in an action for defamation, the defences of privilege, fair comment or justification are available. There is some general defence which may be taken against the action for a number of wrongs. For example, the general defence of ‘Consent’ may be taken, whether the action is for trespass, defamation, false imprisonment, or some other wrong.

The following exceptions to the rule of strict liability have been introduced in course of time, some of them being inherent in the judgment itself in Ryland v. Fletcher:

(i) Damage due to Natural Use of the Land

In Ryland v. Fletcher water collected in the reservoir in such large quantity, was held to be non- natural use of land. Keeping water for ordinary domestic purpose is ‘natural use’. Things not essentially dangerous which is not unusual for a person to have on his own land, such as water pipe installations in buildings, the working of mines and minerals on land, the lighting of fire in a fire-place of a house, and necessary wiring for supplying electric light, fall under the category of “natural use” of land.

(ii) Consent of the plaintiff

Where the plaintiff has consented to the accumulation of dangerous thing on the defendant’s land, the liability under the rule in Ryland v. Flethcher does not arise. Such a consent is implied where the source of danger is for the ‘common benefit’ of both the plaintiff and the defendant.

(iii) Act of Third Party

If the harm has been caused due to the act of a stranger, who is neither defendant’s servant nor agent nor the defendant has any control over him, the defendant will not be liable. Thus, in Box v. Jubh (1879) 4 Ex. D. 76, the overflow from the defendant’s reservoir was caused by blocking of a drain by stranger, the defendant was held not liable. But if the act of the stranger, is or can be foreseen by the defendant and the damage can be prevented, the defendant must, by due care prevent the damage. Failure on his part to avoid such damage will make him liable.

(iv) Statutory Authority

Sometimes, public bodies storing water, gas, electricity and the like are by statute, exempted from liability so long as they have taken reasonable care.

Thus, in Green v. Chelzea Water Works Co. (1894) 70 L.T. 547 the defendant company had a statutory duty to maintain continuous supply of water. A main belonging to the company burst without any fault on its part as a consequence of which plaintiff’s premises were flooded with water. It was held that the company was not liable as the company was engaged in performing a statutory duty.

(v) Act of God

If an escape is caused, through natural causes and without human intervention circumstances which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility, there is then said to exist the defence of Act of God.

(vi) Escape due to plaintiff’s own Default

Damage by escape due to the plaintiff’s own default was considered to be good defence in Rylands v. Fletcher itself. Also, if the plaintiff suffers damage by his own intrusion into the defendant’s property, he cannot complain for the damage so caused.